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It is argued that thirder resolution of the Lewis - Elga controversy
about Sleeping Beauty is more clear when the coin toss is replaced by a
quantum measurement and the analysis is performed in the framework
of the Many-Worlds Interpretation.
1 Lewis - Elga controversy
Lewis's comment (2001) on Elga's paper (2000) has far reaching conse-
quences. If Lewis is right, then the approach to credence for an event as
the value of an \intelligent bet" on this event (e.g. Sklar 1993) does not have
universal applicability. The betting approach to this question (Aumann et
al. 1997) leads to Elga's result which Lewis contests. I believe, however,
that Lewis's approach is untenable, and thus the universality of the betting
approach to probability has not been breached.
I give two arguments in favor of Elga's conclusion, the rst classical, the
second quantum mechanical. It is of interest that a quantum mechanical
analysis can be brought to bear on this classical probability problem.
The rst is as follows: consider the following three experiments, the rst
of which is Elga's. I claim the credence of Beauty is the same in each case.
(i) Beauty sleeps during the week. On Sunday a fair coin is
tossed. If the result is Heads (H), Beauty is awaken on Monday
only, if the result is Tails (T), Beauty is awaken on Monday and
Tuesday. On every awakening, Beauty is told nothing, but must
answer the question: \What is your credence for the coin to be
1
H?" After the conversation her memory of the awakening is erased
and she sleeps again.
(ii) Beauty sleeps for 100 years, uninterrupted save for awak-
enings according to procedure (i), which take place every week,
following a coin toss on each Sunday of each week.
(iii) Beauty sleeps for 100 years, uninterrupted save for 7827
awakenings. Using a classical random number generator to de-
termine the order, on 2609 awakenings a coin is placed H, and
on 5218 awakenings a coin is placed T. On each awakening, the
same procedure is followed as in (i).
Experiment (ii) is not just a repetition of experiment (i) 5218 times. In
the latter, on every awakening, Beauty knows which week it is. In (ii) Beauty
does not know which week it is and, therefore, she does not know which coin
in the sequence the question is about. However, since all the coins are fair,
Beauty's situation is the same in all weeks and thus the lack of information
which week it is cannot make a dierence in her credence.
Experiments (ii) and (iii) are also not identical. The probability in exper-
iment (ii) that one will obtain exactly 2609 H will is very small. However, the
probability that this number will be dierent from 2609 by more than, say,
100, is also very small. Therefore, the probability that the relative frequency
of H will be signicantly dierent from 1:2 is negligible. Thus, although I
do not have an argument according to which Beauty has to give exactly the
same answer in (ii) and (iii), I can argue that these answers cannot dier
signicantly. Since our job is to decide between credences 1/2 (Lewis) and
1/3 (Elga), this is enough.
In experiment (iii) it is obvious that Beauty should give credence 1/3 for
H. If there is no signicant dierence in Beauty's answer in case (iii) and (ii),
and no signicant dierence in her answer in case (ii) and (i), then in Elga's
experiment Beauty should give the answer 1/3, and not 1/2 as Lewis claims.
There is a conceptual dierence between (i) and (ii) (and a similar dif-
ference between (i) and (iii)). In (i) the Beauty was asked a question about
an uncentered proposition: \What is the state of the coin?" In contrast, in
(ii) Beauty was asked a question about a centered proposition: \What is the
state of the coin of this week?" The unusual feature of Elga's experiment,
that Beauty must alter her credence about an uncentered proposition with
no new uncentered evidence, is not present here. But this does not alter the
fact that Beauty must give the same answer in case (ii) and (i).
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Apart from the small statistical dierence between (ii) and (iii) already
mentioned, the two dier in another aspect. In (ii) there is something which
corresponds to Lewis's number 1/2: in half of the weeks of Beauty's sleep
the coin is H, and in half it is T. In contrast, in experiment (iii), nothing
corresponds to 1/2. However, knowledge of this statistical structure to her
string of awakenings, in case (ii), is not knowledge that Beauty can use, since
never on awakening does she learn where in the string she is located.
1.1 The inconsistency of the Lewis approach
In order to see how the dierence between the one-week experiment and
the many-weeks experiment arises, and in order to show the inconsistency
of Lewis's approach, consider an experiment of the kind (ii) but limited to
two weeks. A fair coin is tossed twice. The credence of Beauty p(H) can
be calculated as the sum of conditional probabilities on the outcomes of the
coin tosses:
p(H) = p(HjHH)p(HH)+p(HjTT )p(TT )+p(HjHT )p(HT )+p(HjTH)p(TH)
(1)
It is uncontroversial that p(HjHH) = 1 and p(HjTT ) = 0. Given that
one of the outcomes is H and another T, Beauty knows that there are
three awakenings: one H and two T. Therefore, the conditional credences
of Beauty for these cases are p(HjHT ) = p(HjTH) = 1
3
. According to
Lewis, Beauty has equal credence for all possible outcomes of the coin tosses:
p(HH) = p(TT ) = p(HT ) = p(TH) = 1
4
. It then follows from (1) that
Beauty's credence for H on awakening during the two weeks is p(H) = 5
12
.
This is in contradiction with the assumption that there should be no change
between Elga's one-week experiment and the similar two-week experiment.
Therefore, unless Lewis rejects this very natural assumption, his approach is
inconsistent.
On the analysis that I favor there is no such diculty. On awaken-
ing, Beauty's credences for the four outcomes of the coins tosses should not
be identical, they should be weighted according to the number of awaken-
ing corresponding to these outcomes. Thus p(HH) = 1
6
, p(TT ) = 1
3
, and
p(HT ) = p(TH) = 1
4
. Using (1), it follows that p(H) = 1
3
, just as in the
one-week experiment in accordance with Elga's argument.
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2 The quantum coin experiment
An entirely independent argument to the same conclusion follows from the
interpretation of probability in the Many-Worlds Interpretation (MWI) of
quantum mechanics (an elaboration of the Everett approach (1957)). Con-
sider the toss of a quantum coin, say, for a simple example, the observation
of a photon, incident on semi-transparent mirror, as either reected (R) or
transmitted (T). According to the MWI, the world splits in two: one (the
R-world) in which the photon is observed as reected, and the other (the T
world) in which the photon is observed as transmitted.
Elga's experiment, but with such a quantum coin, is very similar to the
\sleeping pill" experiment (Vaidman 1998), which was introduced to give a
possibility of an ignorance interpretation of probability in the framework of
the MWI. According to this approach, the observer assigns the probability
for outcomes of a quantum measurement in proportion to the \measures
of existence" (Vaidman, 1998) of the corresponding worlds, the modulus
squares of the amplitudes of the corresponding branches of the universal
wave function. (See Saunders (1998) for a discussion of a similar concept of
\measure" .) There is no direct meaning for this probability for the person
who is going to perform the quantum measurement (and who is put to sleep
for its duration): there is no information, centered or uncentered, that he is
then ignorant of. The meaning for probability is given through the (identical)
credences of the two successors of the experimenter, on awakening, in centered
propositions, namely the propositions \I am in the R-world" and \I am in
the T-world". For each of these successors, there is a fact of the matter as
to the outcome of the experiment and he is ignorant of this fact.
It is worth remarking that the problem of the MWI recently posed by
Peter Lewis does not arise in this approach. He argued (Lewis 2000) that
a believer in the MWI should agree to play \quantum Russian roulette",
provided that death is instantaneous . The large \measures" of the worlds
with dead successors is a good reason not to play.
There is a dierence between Elga's experiment and the \sleeping pill"
quantum coin ipping. On awakening, Beauty is not only ignorant of which
world she is in, she is also ignorant of which time she is at in T-world.
There are three mutually exclusive propositions: \I am in an H-world on a
Monday", \I am in a T-world on a Monday" and \I am in a T-world on a
Tuesday", and she must assign credences in them summing to unity. Failing
any other information which could discriminate between the three cases, her
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credences should be in proportion to the \measures" of the corresponding
worlds, which happened to be exactly the same. Therefore, her credence in
each should be the same, namely one third.
There is an important dierence between Elga's experiment with a quan-
tum and a classical coin . Classically, Beauty's credence concerns a proposi-
tion, \the coin is H", and this along with the entire sequence of events are
located in a unique world. It is for this reason that the proposition is reck-
oned to be uncentered. But using a quantum coin, on the MWI, that is no
longer so. Quantum mechanical outcomes are in dierent worlds, and propo-
sitions about such outcomes, such as \the photon is T" should be read as
tacitly indexical, \in this world the photon is T"; they are properly speaking
centered propositions. To revert to our previous discussion, the dierence
between case (i) and case (ii), using a quantum coin, does not concern the
centeredness or otherwise of the proposition Beauty's credence is about. In
both cases it is centered.
On switching to a quantum coin in Elga's experiment, and on interpreting
quantum mechanics in terms of the MWI, one loses the unusual feature that
Lewis found so objectionable: that Beauty must change her credence in an
uncentered proposition, although her uncentered evidence has not changed.
Lewis may even agree, in this case, that Beauty's credence should change, for
it is credence in a centered proposition - and if so he will presumably agree
that her credence in H is one third. But the quantum coin is considered to
be the best possible implementation of a fair coin: Beauty should not have
dierent credences in classical and quantum experiments.
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